In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristophanes BirdsIan C. StoreyNan Dunbar, ed. Aristophanes Birds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. xviii + 792 pp. $105.00.Douglas Young's wonderful translation (The Burdies) is dedicated "to Miss Nan Dunbar with all good wishes for her learned edition of the original Greek." That was in 1959, and while Catullus waited nine years for Cinna's Zmyrna, we Aristophanic ornithophiles have had to wait four times that for this wonderfully thorough commentary (...) on Aristophanes' masterpiece. Birds has not fared as well as either Clouds or Frogs which have long dominated the field (and more recently Acharnians and Lysistrata). D. has now given us the "standard commentary."Although she has provided students with "more help with understanding Greek idiom" (v), it is clearly the professional scholar who will be the principal user of this commentary, especially those who are brought here by a reference to Birds and who will find D.'s notes of immense value. I noted excellent studies of peacocks (165), the agon and its roles (315-18), roosters and the early morning (338f.), the influence of Herodotos (374 et al.), the Orestes-problem (451f.), the meaning of in line 789 where D. lands a telling blow against comedy following tragedy (481), levels of meaning in (535f.), the episkopos as comic figure (562f.), dochmiacs in comedy (611), the figure of Iris (616), the sykophantes (674), the role of Prometheus (693f.), and necromancy in drama (710-12). Such notes are the very real strength of D.'s work.Three areas get special attention. First this is a new text, badly needed since neither the OCT nor the Budé is at all secure in text or critical apparatus. The introduction is dominated (thirty-two of fifty-one pages) by a discussion of the history of the text to the end of the eighteenth century, which she had considered issuing separately, but in the end kept with the rest. It does tend to overbalance the introduction, but is immensely informative and useful reading; I would have liked a list of modern editions of the sort that Rogers provided in his various commentaries. Textual evaluation I leave to the experts, but I observe that D. provides well over a dozen of her own readings ( [1064] and [1229] are attractive) and that many changes concern the attribution of lines to Peisetairos (her spelling, based on seeing the Triballian's [1615] as an attempt to say "yes, Peisetairos") and Euelpides, on the assumption that the clever leading lines belong to P. and the following lines to Eu. I am not sure this works in v. 11 where this clever capping fits P. better than Eu.Places where D.'s text makes a difference in sense include: the archon's name (Charias, not Chabrias); 16, deleting the line and its textual problem; 167, where even D.'s text may not solve the problem; 202, Tereus perches on the roof of the skene; 240, deleting both τε; 484, where is wrong; 533-38, rewriting a corrupt paradosis; 698, where μύχιος adds an edge lacking in νύχιος; 994, keeping the paradosis ("a monstrosity"-Sommerstein); 1212, reading and giving it to Iris; 1441, for the 'impossible' [End Page 336] while including some attractive alternatives in the notes; 1681, βα βάζει γ' where others either obelize or defend βαδίζει; 1757, δαπεδον with an allusion to the uncompleted temple of Zeus.Second D. gives very full accounts of the extraordinary variety of metres used in this play. Each lyric section is prefaced by a metrical analysis and consideration of the overall effect. In 227-62 it is that "of a bird repeating the same unit of rhythm over and over" (210), while the various patterns reflect bird movements. The "astrophic monody" reflects but does not parody the "new music" with which Ar. is clearly familiar (212). In 327-35/343-51-a passage seared into this reviewer's memory from the MPhil examinations of 1971-D. now prefers a change of metre rather than a highly irregular responsion, each metre reflecting the mental attitude of the birds. In 737-52/769-84 there is "no simple metrical description" (462), and D. wonders if Phrynichean tragic lyrics have been adapted "to produce a lighter bird-rhythm." There... (shrink)

I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a (...) very attenuated sense. They do not value goods of kind (b) simply as means to pleasures of kind (a); rather, they have fundamentally different attitudes to (a) and (b). Second, the hedonism that Socrates’ defends includes a distinction between kinds of pleasures: (a) bodily pleasures and (c) the pleasures of virtuous actions. This distinction between kinds of pleasures—some that do and some that do not exert the ‘power of appearance’—allows Socrates to address one of the central beliefs in the popular conception of akrasia, namely that it involves a special kind of unruly desire: non-rational appetites for pleasures like food, drink, or sex. Socrates replaces the motivational push of non-rational appetites with the epistemic pull of the appearance of immediate pleasures like food, drink, and sex. (shrink)

Preoccupation with LTP as a putative memory mechanism may have retarded the consideration of pathological modulation of synaptic plasticity in clinical disorders where memory dysfunction is not a primary feature. Encouraged by Shors & Matzel's review, we consider the relationship between stress, synaptic plasticity, and depressive disorder.

Colour word usage within languages follows the same ordering as that proposed by Berlin and Kay between languages. This provides additional validation and support for Berlin and Kay's schema.

Saunders & van Brakel's criticism of Berlin & Kay's methodology misunderstands the fact that scientific hypotheses are tested by generating new, replicable data with novel explanatory power. Thus, although Berlin and Kay studied differences in colour words between languages, the same patterns are also present in colour word usage within languages, in a range of literary and other textual databases.

In this exciting Handbook, Ian Jarvie and Jesús Zamora-Bonilla have put together a wide-ranging and authoritative overview of the main philosophical currents and traditions at work in the social sciences today. Starting with the history of social scientific thought, this Handbook sets out to explore that core fundamentals of social science practice, from issues of ontology and epistemology to issues of practical method. Along the way it investigates such notions as paradigm, empiricism, postmodernism, naturalism, language, agency, power, culture, and causality.

Feeling out of place because he is the only elephant who sings, Little Elephant sets off a journey to find a home where he belongs.